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A LION IN THE PATH? THE INFLUENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE IMMIGRATION
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
Joan Fitzpatrick* and William McKay Bennett**
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1879,1 the Senate of the United States debated H.R. 2423,
"[a]n act to restrict the immigration of Chinese to the United States."2
Resentful and fearful whites in Western states, especially California,
demanded reduction in the number of Chinese arrivals. The Senate
debate did not focus solely on the desirability of Chinese immigration.
Senators paid great attention to whether the bill would violate Article V
of the Burlingame Treaty of 18683 and, if so, whether Congress could
abrogate the treaty. Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York,5 arguing in
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., Rice University; J.D., Harvard Law School;
Diploma in Law, Oxford University.
** Honor Program Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service (beginning August, 1995); B.S., University of California, Berkeley (1990); J.D., University
of Washington School of Law (1995) (the views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and
are not intended to be attributed in any way to the Department of Justice or the Immigration and
Naturalization Service).
1. See 8 Cong. Rec. 1072, 1235-36, 1264-76, 1299-1316, 1383-1400 (1879).
2. 8 Cong. Rec. 791-92 (January 28, 1879). The bill proposed reducing to fifteen the number of
Chinese passengers who could arrive on any one vessel.
3. Treaty of July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739. Section V provided that:
The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the inherent and
inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the
free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from the one country
to the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents. The high contracting
parties, therefore, join in reprobating any other than an entirely voluntary emigration for these
purposes. They consequently agree to pass laws making it a penal offense for a citizen of the
United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects either to the United States or to any
other foreign country, or for a Chinese subject or citizen of the United States to take citizens of
the United States to China or to any other foreign country, without their free and voluntary
consent respectively.
4. See, e.g., a lengthy essay included in the report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor on H.R. No. 2423, answering in the affirmative the question, "Can Congress Repeal a
Treaty?" 8 Cong. Rec. 793 (January 28, 1879). This essay observed that the question of Chinese
immigration "is not one of right but of policy," and that, if the presence of Chinese "endangers the
peace or prosperity of our people, no mere technical considerations should intervene...... Id.
5. 8 Cong. Rec. 1307-09 (February 14, 1879).
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opposition to the act, picturesquely described the Burlingame Treaty as
"a lion in the path" of those seeking to limit Chinese immigration.6
Conkling instead proposed instructing the President to renegotiate the
treaty with China.7 President Rutherford B. Hayes vetoed H.R. 24238 and
then pursued Conkling's proposed alternative, negotiating a
supplementary treaty in 1880 that conferred on the United States the
authority to regulate, limit, or suspend the immigration of Chinese
laborers, but not to prohibit it.9
The desire to keep faith with treaty partners carried the day again in
1882 when President Chester A. Arthur vetoed S. 71, a twenty-year
suspension of Chinese immigration disingenuously titled "An act to
execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese.""° In subsequent
years, however, Congress repeatedly passed Chinese exclusion laws that
contravened the treaty obligations of the United States." The power of
Congress to override treaty commitments was ultimately sustained by the
Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case.'2 As a result, the courts
permit the political branches to abrogate the rights that non-citizens hold
under international law.
Has international law truly been "a lion in the path" of immigration
policymakers? Or has it been a near irrelevance? While the racism that
filled the pages of the Congressional Record and the United States
Reports during the Chinese exclusion era has thankfully disappeared, the
discourse of international law seems to have vanished along with it. That
immigration policy necessarily implicates our relationships with other
nations is self-evident. In consequence, one would expect the bilateral
and multilateral obligations of the United States to play a prominent role
6. 8 Cong. Rec. 1309 (February 14, 1879) ("[T]he difficulty with Congress [restricting Chinese
immigration] is that here stands a treaty, a lion in the path in the estimation of a great part of this
body and of a great part of the nation."). Conkling's metaphor is probably an allusion to a passage in
Pilgrim's Progress in which Christian encounters two lions on the path to the Palace Beautiful. See
John Bunyan, Pilgrim's Progress 48-49 (James Blanton Wharey ed., 1928).
7. 8 Cong. Rec. 1390 (February 15, 1879). The amendment was defeated by a vote of 34 against
to 31 in favor. Id. at 1390-91.
8. 8 Cong. Rec. 2275 (March 1, 1879). See infra notes 65-67 for discussion of Hayes's veto
message.
9. Treaty of November 17, 1880,22 Stat. 826.
10. 13 Cong. Rec. 2551 (April 4, 1882). See infra note 71 for disctssion of Arthur's veto
message.
11. Act of September 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 476; Act of October 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504 (Scott Act); Act
of May 5, 1892,27 Stat. 25 (Geary Act).
12. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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in shaping, if not dictating, immigration policy. Yet, especially in recent
decades, this is often not the case.
This article explores the place of international law in the immigration
policy process in four settings: (1) the tentative and ultimately failed
efforts of the executive and the judiciary to keep Congress within the
bounds of internationally law-abiding conduct with respect to Chinese
exclusion; (2) the almost complete disregard by Congress and the
executive of international norms concerning health-related travel
restrictions relating to HIV/AIDS; (3) Congressional inaction in the face
of executive and judicial hypocrisy toward fundamental principles of
refugee law in relation to interdiction of asylum-seekers; and (4) the
emergence of a perverse canon presuming the abrogation of uncodified
customary norms in cases involving temporary refuge for victims of
armed conflict and arbitrary detention of excludable aliens. This article
does not treat these four subjects exhaustively. Instead, it poses the
question of the proper respect immigration policymakers should pay to
the United States' pre-existing international obligations and examines
how this respect has varied over time and among the branches.
A. The Status of International Law as Law of the United States
The basic conceptual framework concerning the status of international
law in the United States can be concisely described. Treaties are the
supreme law of the land, 3 whether they be self-executing treaties (which
the judiciary may immediately enforce) or non-self-executing treaties
(which Congress must implement by statute before the courts will
enforce them).t4 Non-self-executing treaties that have not been
implemented by statute are nevertheless the law of the land, in the sense
of expressing a national policy binding on the states.' Some ambiguity
exists regarding which branch may terminate a treaty so as to extinguish,
lawfully, the nation's international obligation. 6 As between a treaty and
a conflicting statute, the later in time controls. t7 Thus, an act of Congress
13. U.S. Const. arLt. VI.
14. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,314 (1829).
15. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: .4 Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 866-67 (1987).
16. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979); David Gray Adler, The
Constitution and the Termination of Treaties (1986); Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and
President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the
Constitution Historically Examined, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 4 (1979).
Washington Law Review Nrol. 70:589, 1995
that results in a breach of pre-existing treaty obligations will nonetheless
be given domestic legal effect. Tempering this result, an important rule
of construction provides that statutes should not be interpreted as
inconsistent with treaties unless no other construction is possible."
Customary international law is formed by the cons:.stent practice of
states undertaken by them from a sense of legal obligation.'9 Following
inherited British tradition," customary law is automatically incorporated
into domestic law. It is generally regarded as a species of federal
common law,2 although no specific reference to customary law is made
in the Supremacy Clause.22 The power to abrogate customary
international law is the subject of much controversy, centering on opaque
dictum in the Supreme Court's seminal decision in The Paquete
Habana.23
B. Receptivity to International Law in the Immigration Context
At one time, awareness of the relevance of the: United States'
international obligations as a source of rules in the immigration field was
highly visible. The Supreme Court recognized that treaties have
equivalent status with statutes and that any of the three branches of the
federal government may be required to implement their terms. In Fong
17. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 628 (1889).
18. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Ralph G.
Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand.
L. Rev. 1103, 1105 (1990).
19. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987).
20. Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938 (K.B. 1764).
21. Louis Henkin questions the utility and accuracy of this characterization, noting that it stems
from an unthinking "tendency to define all law that is not legislative in orign as common law" and
that it fails to consider the important ways in which customary law diffi-rs from common law.
Henkin, supra note 15, at 875-76.
22. The "law of nations" is referenced in the United States Constitution, however. U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 10.
23. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The Court held, "International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdicti3n as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. at 700. It immediately
qualified this holding by stating, "For this purpose, where there is no traty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations .... Id.
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Yue Ting v. United States4 the Court described the process by which
immigration policy is defined:
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the
government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress,
and to be executed by the executive authority according to the
regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department
has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the
paramount law of the constitution, to intervene."
As Louis Henkin has noted, the Chinese Exclusion Case established
dual propositions-first, that the power of Congress over the exclusion
of aliens, being derived from inherent sovereignty, is plenary; and,
second, that Congress may effectively deprive individuals of their rights
under treaties by passage of inconsistent legislation.26 Thus, while
notions of sovereignty drawn from the public international law of the
time were accepted as a source of Congressional power to exclude the
Chinese, the idea that international law might restrain Congress's policy
choices was less obvious.
In the decades since the Supreme Court decided the Chinese Exclusion
Case, immigration policymakers have become increasingly indifferent to
international law as a factor in the policy mix. Recently, they have failed
to note the existence of relevant international obligations, disingenuously
misconstrued international norms, and paid undeserved deference to the
law-breaking conduct of a coordinate branch.
The thesis of this article is that even if the political branches possess
raw power to violate treaties and customary norms, they must act
unambiguously when doing so. At a minimum, their awareness of the
24. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). This was a test case involving three Chinese immigrants, Fong Yue
Ting, Wong Quan and Lee Joe. Chinese immigrant societies popularly known as the Six Companies,
see infra note 54, had requested the advice of several prominent attorneys on the constitutionality of
the 1892 Geary Act and had been advised that the statute was unconstitutional. The Six Companies
thereupon advised Chinese immigrants not to apply for the certificates of residence required under
the Geary Act to avoid deportation. Mary Roberts Coolidge, Chinese Immigration 219-221 (1909).
Fong Yue Ting, president of the Chinese Civil Rights League of New York, refused to obtain a
certificate and called a mass meeting at the Cooper Union. Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, China and the
Overseas Chinese in the United States, 1868-1911, at 97 (1983) [hereinafter Tsai, Overseas
Chinese]. Only 13,242 of 106,668 resident Chinese complied with the Geary Act's registration
requirements. Facing an estimated removal cost of over $7 million once the Supreme Court sustained
the Geary Act, Congress chose to extend the registration period for an additional year. Coolidge,
supra, at 226-27.
25. 149 U.S. at 713.
26. Henkin, supra note 15, at 853-54.
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existence of a relevant international obligation sh ould be clearly
demonstrated. Breach of treaty or customary law should not be permitted
to occur by implication. As the following case studies will show, to allow
such breaches can lead to disastrous consequences.
II. THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACTS
The United States, a nation largely composed of recent migrants,
rarely attempted to regulate immigration at the federal level during the
first century of its existence.27 In the second half of the nineteenth
century, as Congress began to establish criteria for entry into the United
States,28 the Chinese were the targets of increasingly restrictive measures.
In 1862, Congress acted against the "coolie trade,"29 banning the
coercion or trickery of Chinese laborers into indentured servitude while
preserving their right to immigrate voluntarily." In 1874, President
Ulysses Grant, responding to agitation by groups such as Dennis
Kearney's Workingman's Party in California,3 suggested the need to
cure the "Chinese immigration problem"--defined as he persistence of
the coolie trade and the entry of Chinese women as prostitutes.32
27. The primary exception was enactment of the Aliens Act and the Alien Enemies Act in 1798.
See Edward P. Hutchinson, Legislative History ofAmerican Immigration Policy, 1798-1965, at 11-
16(1981).
28. See, e.g., 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (excluding persons convicted of felonies and women "imported
for the purposes of prostitution" from entry into the United States); see also Hutchinson, supra note
27, at 65-66 (1981).
29. An Act to Prohibit the "Coolie Trade" by American Citizens in American Vessels, 12 Stat.
340 (1862).
30. In 1864, Congress clarified that labor contracts under which would-be immigrants pledged
their wages to pay for their transportation were valid, as long as the contract did not exceed one
year's duration. An Act to Encourage Immigration, 13 Stat. 385 (1864). Many Chinese laborers
immigrated under this "credit-ticket" system and were not considered to be coolies. See Hyung-chan
Kim, A Legal History ofAsian Americans, 1790-1990, at 51-52 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, The Chinese Experience in America 57-60 (1986)
[hereinafter Tsai, Chinese Experience]; Coolidge, supra note 24, at 109-41; Tien-Lu Li,
Congressional Policy of Chinese Immigration 24-25 (1916).
32. In a message delivered December 7, 1874, President Grant stated:
mhe great proportion of the Chinese immigrants who come to our shores do not come
voluntarily .... In a worse form does this apply to Chinese women. Hardly a perceptible
percentage of them perform any honorable labor, but they are brought for shameful purposes, to
the disgrace of communities where settled and to the great demoralizatior of the youth of these
localities.
Hutchinson, supra note 27, at 65.
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The coolie trade never figured largely in Chinese migration to the
United States.3 Opponents of Chinese migration falsely characterized
Chinese laborers as coolies in order to press for severe restrictions on the
entry of workers attracted by opportunities in the gold mines, on the
railroads, and in service industries such as laundries. A characteristic
assessment of the "unfair competition" posed by voluntary Chinese
migrants was offered by Justice Stephen Field, sitting as Circuit Justice
in In re Low Yam Chow: 4
Chinese laborers, including in that designation not merely those
engaged in manual labor, but those skilled in some art or trade, in a
special manner interfered in many ways with the industries and
businesses of [California]. Their frugal habits, the absence of
families, their ability to live in narrow quarters without apparent
injury to health, their contentment with small gains and the simplest
fare, gave them great advantages in the struggle with our laborers
and mechanics, who always and properly seek something more
from their labors than sufficient for a bare livelihood, and must
have and should have something for the comforts of a home and the
education of their children. 5
These sentiments were translated both into direct action by hostile
whites and into oppressive and discriminatory state regulation of the
employment and living conditions of Chinese residents. The most violent
anti-Chinese agitation was carried out by working class white men,
sometimes with the encouragement of certain labor leaders.36 Whites
engaged in a series of massacres of Chinese miners and attacks upon
33. China agreed to a ban on the coolie trade in Article VI of the Burlingane Treaty of 1868. See
supra note 3.
34. 13 F. 605 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
35. Id. at 607.
36. Coolidge, supra note 24; Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 60-63 (describing Denver
riot of 1880); id. at 72-80 (describing Rock Springs massacre and Seattle riot of 1885); id. at 83
(describing role of Knights of Labor and Cigar-makers Union in burning of San Francisco's
Chinatown).
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areas of Chinese residence,37 complicating the relationship between
China and the United States.38
State and local government bodies in the West adopted a variety of
measures designed to deprive the Chinese of economic opportunity and
to discourage further entry. The victims of anti-Chinese state legislation
in the 1860s and 1870s experienced a high degree of success in
challenging these measures by means of litigation. The Chinese and their
attorneys established important equal protection precedents39 and
obtained relief even from virulently anti-Chinese and politically
ambitious jurists such as Justice Stephen Field.4" Field advised California
37. Anti-Chinese attacks occurred in 1885 in Squaw Valley and Coal Creek in Washington
Territory; Sacramento; San Francisco (where rioters burned Chinatown and murdered thirteen
Chinese); and in 1887 at the Snake River in Oregon. These attacks sometimas involved the robbery
and murder of Chinese gold miners. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 83, 86-89; Tsai,
Chinese Experience, supra note 31, at 67-72.
38. The Chinese government demanded reparation for killed and injured Chinese and
contemplated limiting emigration unless the safety of the Chinese residents in the United States
could be secured. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 81-89.
39. For example, the classic case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), was funded by a
Chinese laundryman's guild and handled by prominent San Francisco lawyer Hall McAllister.
Charles . McClain & Laurene Wu McClain, The Chinese Contribution to the Development of
American Law, in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943, at
12-15 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991).
40. Id. at 8-16 (discussing Field's attitudes and his decision as Circuit Justice in Ho Ah Kow v.
Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546), and in In re Quong 'Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1882)). Some of Field's decisions striking down oppressive state laws were conceptually
innovative, even by today's standards. In Ho Ah Kow, Field struck down San Francisco's "queue
ordinance," which prescribed close-cropping the hair of male prisoners. This measure was applied
against Chinese laborers convicted under California's "cubic air" statute (making it a criminal
offense to inhabit overcrowded accommodations), which was also aimed at he Chinese. McClain &
McClain, supra note 39, at 9-10. Field stressed the relevance of racial motivation in the adoption
and administration of the "queue ordinance":
[W]e cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we take
our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what
we see as men; and where an ordinance, though general in its terms, only operates upon a
special race.., it being universally understood that it is to be enforced only against that race...
we may justly conclude that it was the intention ... that it should only have such operation, and
treat it accordingly.
12 F. Cas. at 255.
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politicians to seek an alternative remedy at the federal level,4 and this
advice was eventually taken.42
Congressional debates over immigration restrictions on the Chinese
tended to divide along geographical and class lines.43 California Senator
Sargent demanded the empathy of his colleagues for his state, asserting
that by 1879 there were more Chinese immigrants than voters residing
there.' Although his opponents caricatured the supporters of Chinese
exclusion as "sand-lot orators and hoodlums,"45 violent anti-Chinese
attitudes were held by many members of political elites in the Western
states.46 In contrast, elites in other parts of the country sometimes favored
Chinese migration, either out of sympathy for the rights of migrants,47
41. See In re Ah Fang, I F. Cas. 213, 217 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102). In 1876, California
congressmen submitted several resolutions asking the President to modify existing treaties between
China and the United States to "prevent any further immigration of the subjects of that empire to the
United States." Hutchinson, supra note 27, at 68 (footnotes omitted). On February 28, 1877, the
House received a report from a special joint committee appointed to investigate Chinese immigration
on the West Coast. Id. at 69-70.
42. Congress adopted a joint resolution in 1878 requesting the President to seek a modification of
the Burlingame Treaty. 7 Cong. Rec. 4782 (June 17, 1878).
43. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 46 ("[T]he Chinese immigration issue, to a certain
extent, was a sectional as well as a partisan one, with the West and the South on one side and the
East on the other.").
44. 8 Cong. Rec. 1265 (February 13, 1879). In 1849, 715 Chinese entered the United States. The
following year 4,000 entered California alone, and by 1852 the rate of entry into California had
reached a magnitude of 20,000. By the end of the 1850s, several California counties had populations
that were half Chinese. Kim, supra note 30, at 47.
45. 8 Cong. Rec. 1392 (February 15, 1879) (remarks of Sen. Matthews) ("[Tihere are some other
people in this country who are interested in this question of Chinese immigration besides the citizens
who dwell on the Pacific coast, and there are some people in the country to be conciliated otherwise
than sand-lot orators and hoodlums.').
46. See, e.g., Christian G. Fritz, Due Process, Treaty Rights, and Chinese Exclusion, 1882-1891,
in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943, at 25-56 (Sucheng
Chan ed., 1991).
47. For example, Sen. Hoar of Massachusetts associated the anti-Chinese racism of the
Californians with the anti-black racism of the South:
mhe Senator from California in his argument struck hands with the Senator from Alabama and
but repeated the old taunts and the old arguments which had been ringing in our ears for two
generations. I do not believe that it is necessary for the future of this Republic to prohibit to any
man who seeks its shores of his own volition the right to enter in the mode and at the time he
may choose, and to remain as a citizen or as a laborer or as a resident so long as he may choose.
I believe that right is the right to the pursuit of happiness with which the Creator has clothed
every human being ....
8 Cong. Rec. 1314 (February 14, 1879).
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concern for treaty obligations,' 8 or out of approval of the impact upon the
labor market.49
The Chinese government's attitude toward the migration of its
subjects to the United States was complex but generally passive. Initial
treaty relationships between China and the United States focused upon
opening up the Chinese economy and society to American merchants and
missionaries." Americans were limited to certain treaty ports, however,
as were other Westerners."' The treaties of 1844 and 1858 did not
specifically address the rights of Chinese to enter and to work in the
United States. 2 Chinese legal tradition prohibited the emigration of the
Emperor's subjects-indeed, migration out of China was punishable as a
capital offense.53 Yet, the demographics of Guangdong (Kwangtung)
Province compelled labor migration.: This migration remained
technically criminal until China acceded to the Burlingame Treaty in
1868, formally recognizing the "inherent and inalienable right of man to
change his home and allegiance."55
The drafting history of the Burlingame Treaty illus'iates the general
tendency toward passivity by the Chinese government on the question of
its subjects' rights in the United States. Anson Burlingame had served as
American minister to China; upon his retirement, he essentially reversed
roles and became minister from China to the United States. Convinced
48. See supra notes 5-6 (remarks of Sen. Conkling).
49. See, e.g., 8 Cong. Rec. 1385-87 (February 15, 1879) (remarks of Sen. Hamlin of Maine).
50. Treaty of July 3, 1844, 8 Stat. 592; Treaty of Tientsin of June 18, 185:3, 12 Stat. 1023. Tien-lu
Li notes that these treaties were one-sided, guaranteeing protection for Americans in China but
neglecting reciprocal protection for Chinese in the United States. Tien-lu Li, ;upra note 3 1, at 16-17.
51. These geographical restrictions were cited in Congressional debates an grounds for abrogating
the Burlingame Treaty. See, e.g., 8 Cong. Rec. 1267-69 (February 13, 1879) (remarks of Sen.
Grover).
52. See supra note 50.
53. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 8-12.
54. Id. at 10-13. Most Chinese emigrants to California originated in Guangdong Province. L. Eve
Armentrout Ma, Chinatown Organizations and the Anti-Chinese Movement, 1882-1914, in Entry
Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943, at 149 (Sucheng Chan ed.,
1991). Regional associations (huiguan) attracting members from various districts in Guangdong
were prominent in the Chinese immigrant community in California; the Six Companies of San
Francisco's Chinatown were essentially a confederation of these huiguan. Ik. at 149-51; 8 Owen M.
Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State,
1888-1910, at 304 n.33 (1993).
55. Burlingame Treaty, supra note 3, Article V. This language was reminiscent of the Hostages
Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223.
56. Burlingame had served for six years as U.S. Minister to China, prior to resigning "in the
interest of his country and civilization" to take up the post of "High Minister empowered to attend to
Vol. 70:589, 1995
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of the potential profitability of the China trade, Burlingame found a
fellow believer in Secretary of State Seward, who acted as the primary
drafter of the Burlingame Treaty. 7 The Chinese authorities ratified
Burlingame's actions after the fact, apparently surprised but pleased with
his efforts."
While this history suggested that China would be largely indifferent to
violations of its subjects' treaty rights, Congress occasionally pondered
the potential adverse impact upon Americans resident in China if the
Burlingame Treaty was breached by Chinese exclusion laws. For
example, during the Senate debate on H.R. 2423 in 1879, Senator
Edmunds unsuccessfully proposed an amendment stating:
That the United States hereby recognize a reciprocal right and
power in the government of China to regulate, as far as its own
dominions are concerned, intercourse between the two countries
according to its own sense of propriety notwithstanding existing
treaties with the United States .... 59
As it turned out, the risks to American interests in China resulting from
the exclusion acts emanated primarily from threats of popular violence"
and a boycott of American-made goods organized by non-governmental
elements,6 rather than from the Chinese government.
In light of this official passivity, the defense of Chinese treaty rights
fell to those in Congress who placed a high value on maintaining the
national honor, to Presidents contemplating exercise of the veto power,
and to the courts, as individuals affected by the exclusion and
deportation acts raised challenges based on international law. For over a
decade after proponents of Chinese exclusion sought relief at the federal
level, these combined efforts were sufficient to maintain the international
legality of United States immigration policy.
When the President failed to secure revisions to the Burlingame
Treaty in response to a joint resolution adopted by Congress in 1878,62
every question arising between China and the treaty powers," on November 22, 1867. Li, supra note
31, at 17.
57. Id.
58. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 24-29.
59. 8 Cong. Rec. 1391 (February 15, 1879).
60. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 89-90.
61. Id. at 104-08 (discussing boycott aimed at protesting the Geary Act of 1892, which provided
for the deportation of Chinese residents who failed to procure a certificate of residence from federal
authorities).
62. See supra note 42.
599
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impatient legislators suggested that this executive inaction might signal
an implicit invitation to adopt measures frankly breaching the treaty.63
Congress in 1879 passed H.R. 2423, severely limiting the number of
Chinese passengers that could board American vessels to the United
States.'
President Hayes vetoed H.R. 2423, citing two principal reasons: (1)
under the Constitution, it is the President, not Congress, who has the
ability to abrogate a treaty, with the advice and consent of the Senate;
and (2) since it was likely that China would agree to some modification
of the treaty, pursuing diplomatic negotiation would be preferable to
unilateral action.' President Hayes concluded his veto message by
indicating that he found it unnecessary to refer tD "more general
considerations of interest and duty which sacredly guard the faith of the
nation . .. [and which] animate the deliberations of Congress and
pervade the minds of our whole people."66 He expressed his confidence
that "renewed attention" by Congress would "maintain the public duty
and the public honor."67
The President negotiated a supplementary treaty with China in 1880,
allowing the United States to "regulate, limit or suspend" immigration by
Chinese laborers but "not absolutely prohibit it. '68 Any regulation or
suspension was to be reasonable and would apply only to laborers.69
Chinese laborers already residing in the United States were granted the
right to leave and to re-enter, a right frequently used in order to marry or
to visit family residing in China.70
63. See, e.g., 8 Cong. Rec. 1271 (February 13, 1879) (remarks of Sen. Morgan) ("The apparent
willingness of the Government to allow this important subject to drift aivay from its diplomatic
control into the control of the legislative department seems to imply an expectation, if not a desire,
that Congress will cut the Gordian knot.").
64. 8 Cong. Rec. 447, 791,793 (1879).
65. 8 Cong. Rec. 2275 (1879).
66. 8 Cong. Rec. 2276 (March 1, 1879).
67. Id.
68. Treaty of November 17, 1880, U.S.-China, 22 Stat. 826.
69. Article II of the 1880 treaty provided that "teachers, students, merchants or [persons
travelling] from curiosity, together with their body and household servants, and Chinese laborers
who are now in the United States shall be allowed to go and to come of their own free will and
accord...."Id.
70. Relatively few Chinese laborers brought wives with them or married in the United States. Few
job opportunities other than prostitution were open to Chinese women is the United States. As a
consequence, the representation of women among Chinese immigrants in the United States ranged as
low as 3.6% (in 1890) to 7.2% (in 1870). Sucheng Chan, The Exclusion of Chinese Women, 1870-
1943, in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in Amrica. 1882-1943, at 94
(Sucheng Chan ed., 1991).
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Opponents of Chinese immigration were not satisfied with the new
treaty and soon demanded legislation exceeding its moderate terms.
Senate Bill No. 71 of 1882 would have "suspended" immigration by
Chinese laborers for a period of twenty years. President Chester A.
Arthur, after examining the negotiating history of the 1880 treaty,
concluded in his veto message of April 4, 1882, that:
neither contracting party in concluding the treaty of 1880
contemplated the passage of an act prohibiting immigration for
twenty years . . . or thought that such a period would be a
reasonable suspension or limitation, or intended to change the
provisions of the Burlingame Treaty to that extent. I regard this
provision of the act as a breach of our national faith .... [T]he
honor of the country constrains me to return the act with this
objection to its passage.71
Despite these high-minded views, little more than a month later President
Arthur signed into law a bill suspending immigration of Chinese laborers
for a period often years.72 Later in the decade, California's importance in
presidential politics became so great that it deeply affected the
Executive's attitude toward the question of Chinese exclusion.' After
President Arthur's 1882 veto, the executive branch ceased playing a
central role in preserving the international legality of immigration policy
toward the Chinese.
Federal officials in fact began implementing the Chinese exclusion
laws with draconian severity.74 Chinese immigrants sought relief through
litigation, just as they had successfully challenged discriminatory state
laws.75 Their efforts provide a valuable object-lesson for present-day
lawyers seeking to insure that the United States conforms to its
71. 13 Cong. Rec. 2551-52 (1882) (veto message concerning Senate Bill No. 71 by President
Chester A. Arthur).
72. The bill was misleadingly titled "an Act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to
Chinese." 22 Stat. 58 (1882). It also contained provisions for the deportation of Chinese persons
found to be unlawfully present in the United States and prohibited any court from admitting Chinese
persons to citizenship. 13 Cong. Rec. 2967-74 (1882).
73. For example, Democratic President Grover Cleveland, alarmed at electoral losses in
California, Colorado, Nevada and Oregon, ordered Secretary of State Bayard to renegotiate the 1880
treaty so as to provide a political advantage in the 1888 elections. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra
note 24, at 88-89.
74. See Lucy E. Salyer, "Laws Harsh as Tigers". Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws,
1891-1924, in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943, at 57-
93 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991).
75. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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international obligations in the treatment of aliens. Legal challenges to
the Chinese exclusion laws were carefully orchestrated, with test cases
selected and litigated by prominent white attorneys retained by organized
Chinese groups.76 Chinese access to excellent representation generated
much resentment.7 That nearly 90% of the federal habeas corpus
applications filed on behalf of returning or entering Chinese were
successful aroused hostility not only against the Chinese, fueling efforts
to make the exclusion laws ever more draconian, but also against their
lawyers and the federal judges whose sense of duty and fairness overrode
their racial prejudice.78
A crucial test of judicial respect for the international obligations of the
United States arose out of the Act of July 5, 1884,, which required
Chinese to produce a certificate of identity as "the only evidence
permissible to establish [their] right of re-entry" into the United States.7 9
The Act was necessary, opponents of Chinese immigration argued,
because perjury was frequently committed by Chinese laborers claiming
prior residence in the United States. Furthermore, they contended that
procurement of "Canton certificates," issued pursuant to the 1882 act to
signify membership in the excepted classes, was riddled with fraud. 0
The bill lacked specific provision for Chinese laborers who resided in
the United States as of November 1880 but who had departed
temporarily prior to the effective date of the law. These persons were
beneficiaries of the Supplementary Treaty's guarantee of a right to re-
enter, but they lacked certificates because no such certificates existed
prior to their departure. Congress's intention regarding the re-entry rights
of this particular group of Chinese laborers was ambiguous.
76. See, e.g., McClain & McClain, supra note 39, at 3-24.
77. Fritz, supra note 46, at 37-38,45.
78. Id. at 28-51 (noting, id. at 46, a report in the Alta California newspaper that 87% of the
roughly 4000 habeas corpus petitions filed by arriving Chinese between 1882 and January 1888 had
been granted).
79. An act to amend an act entitled "An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to
Chinese," 23 Stat. 115 (1884).
80. "Canton certificates" (so-called because of the locale of most embarkations from China
toward the United States) were to be procured from Chinese officials prior to the departure of
merchants, students and other non-laborers who retained rights of entry under the 1880
Supplementary Treaty. In his annual message on December 4, 1883, Pre,.ident Arthur stated that
there was "reason to believe that the law restricting immigration of Chinese has been violated,
intentionally or otherwise, by the officials in China on whom is devolved the duty of certifying that
the immigrants belong to the excepted classes." Hutchinson, supra note 27, at 85. The committee
report on the 1884 House bill referred to "the notorious capabilities of the ower classes of Chinese
for perjury." H.R. Rep. No. 614,48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884); 15 Cong. Rec. 240, 3752 (1884).
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In typically strict fashion, immigration officials on the West Coast
denied entry to all returning Chinese laborers who lacked certificates.
Pursuant to this policy, the collector excluded returning laborer Chew
Heong in September 1884. Chew Heong was prepared to prove residence
in the United States as of November 1880 and departure to Hawaii in
1881, prior to the availability of re-entry certificates."' A mixed panel
consisting of Circuit Justice Field, Circuit Judge Sawyer and District
Judges Hoffman and Sabin reviewed his application for a writ of habeas
corpus.8 2 Under the jurisdictional statutes of the time, the opinion of the
Circuit Justice was regarded as prevailing. 3 Thus, Field rendered the
opinion for the court even though the other three members of the panel
strenuously dissented.
Field's opinion is concise, emphasizing: (1) that if the collector's
application of the statute leads to absurd or harsh results, the remedy lies
with his administrative superiors or with Congress; (2) that "loose
notions . . . as to the obligation of an oath" manifested by Chinese
seeking entry fully justified Congress's determination to require
U.S.-issued certificates as exclusive proof of re-entry entitlement; and,
most significant, (3) the need for responsiveness to "a sense of
impatience in the public mind with judicial officers for not announcing
the law to be what the community at the time wishes it should be."84
Circuit Judge Sawyer's dissent repeatedly stresses the importance of
national faith and honor in construing the statute in light of the treaty. He
asserts that:
[The court] cannot attribute to congress a deliberate intention to
commit [an] act of bad faith, without provisions manifesting such a
purpose, far more explicit than any found in the act. It would be
disrespectful to that body, if not absolutely indecent, to attribute to
it such an act of bad faith.
Noting that the re-entry provisions of the 1880 treaty had been
carefully negotiated by a "special mission, composed of three
distinguished gentlemen,"86 Sawyer insists that, had Congress intended to
81. In re Cheen Heong [sic), 21 F. 791,791 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
82. Id. Sabin was District Judge for Nevada but often sat on circuit panels in California.
83. Fritz, supra note 46, at 41.
84. 21 F. 791,793-94.
85. Id. at 798 (Sawyer, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 797. They were James B. Angell, former President of the University of Michigan who
had recently been appointed U.S. Minister to China; John F. Swift of California; and William H.
Trescot of South Carolina. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 53-54.
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deprive Chew Heong of a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right of
re-entry, it "would certainly have acted in a manly way, and expressed
that intention boldly, openly, and by plain and direct language which
could not be misunderstood."87
Addressing the political context within which the federal judges in
California of that time operated, Sawyer notes that tht tide of Chinese
immigration had not only moderated but perhaps reversed.88 Even
assuming that the problem of Chinese immigration remained acute,
Sawyer concludes that "there is a price too high to be paid, without
absolute necessity, in any case, for the exclusion of Chi:aese laborers, and
that price is the national honor."89
When Chew Heong sought review in the Supreme Court, Sawyer's
theme of faith and honor resounded in Justice Harlan's majority
opinion.90 Harlan alludes to the principle of pacta sunt servanda,91 and
sets forth the required interpretive framework:
[T]he court cannot be unmindful of the fact that the honor of the
government and people of the United States is involved in every
inquiry whether rights secured by [treaties] shall be :recognized and
protected. And it would be wanting in proper respect for the
intelligence and patriotism of a co-ordinate department of the
government were it to doubt, for a moment, that these
considerations were present in the minds of its members when the
legislation in question was enacted.92
Harlan describes an interesting allocation of roles and responsibilities.
He suggests that a failure by Congress to legislate with careful attention
87. 21 F. at 806.
88. Sawyer cites a statistic indicating that in the 28 months since the adoption of the 1882 act, the
number of Chinese departures had exceeded arrivals by 12,000. Id. at 807-03.
89. Id. at 808.
90. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). The Court rever;ed by a vote of seven to
two, with Field and Bradley in dissent. In a letter to District Judge Matthew Deady of Oregon
marked "Confidential-Destroy," Judge Sawyer expressed his sense of vindication as follows:
[I]t is some consolation, after all the lying, abuse, threatening of impelichment etc. as to our
construction of the Chinese restriction act, and the grand glorification of brother Field for
coming out here and so easily, promptly and thoroughly sitting down on us and setting us right
on that subject to find that we are not so widely out of our senses after all.
Quoted in Fritz, supra note 46, at 43.
91. 112 U.S. at 539 (citing Vattel); id. at 550 (referring to the "inviolable fidelity with which,
according to the established rules of international law, the stipulations of treaties should be
observed").
92. Id. at 540.
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to international obligation denotes both a lack of intelligence and a lack
of patriotism. The repudiation of international obligation would reflect
badly not only on Congress, but on the people as a whole. Finally,
Harlan postulates a responsibility of the courts that is simultaneously
activist and deferential. The command to construe statutes consistently
with international law, against an otherwise plausible literal meaning,
may involve an intrusion by the courts into immigration policymaking.
But Harlan suggests that this posture is ultimately deferential, being
shaped by the courts' "proper respect" for a coordinate branch.
Field's intemperate dissent not only reviles the Chinese for their
allegedly repulsive habits and character but argues that the Burlingame
Treaty was a bad bargain:
The stipulations of the treaty, so far as the residence of the citizens
or subjects of one country in the other and the trade which would
follow such residence are concerned, are.., one-sided .... There is
not and never has been any "mutual advantage" in the migration or
emigration of the citizens or subjects, respectively, from one
country to the other which the treaty, in "cordially recognizing,"
assumes to exist. Suggestions of any such mutuality were deceptive
and false from the outset.93
He insists that principles of construction to avoid unjust or absurd results
have no application where it is alleged that Congress has legislated in
derogation of a treaty.94 Field's position in Chew Heong contradicts his
earlier decisions as Circuit Justice attempting to construe the certificate
provisions of the 1882 act consistently with the 1880 treaty,95 a change of
heart he explicitly acknowledges.96
Chew Heong's victory could not protect his countrymen from further
deprivation of treaty rights. In 1888, Congress passed legislation
repealing both the 1882 and the 1884 acts.97 Anticipating renegotiation of
the treaty with China, the original act of 1888 provided for a twenty-year
93. Id. at 567.
94. Id. at 561-562.
95. See, e.g., In re Ah Sing, 13 F. 286,289 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605,
610 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
96. 112 U.S. at 568-569 (noting that he had formerly been of the view that legislation restricting
Chinese immigration would violate the Burlingame Treaty, until China's failure to eradicate the
coolie trade and to provide any real commercial advantages to America had been called to his
attention).
97. Act of September 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 476.
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suspension of immigration by Chinese laborers.98 Actiag with unseemly
haste based upon unconfirmed rumors in a London newspaper that the
Chinese government had rejected the twenty-year suspension,99 Congress
passed the Scott Act indefinitely prohibiting the re-entry of Chinese
laborers holding certificates issued under the 1882 and 1884 acts.00
Despite his knowledge that negotiations with China were continuing in
good faith, President Cleveland signed this bill into law. 1
Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese laborer who had lived in the United
States for twelve years prior to making a visit to China in 1887. Before
he left the United States he obtained the required certificate for re-entry.
In transit at the time the Scott Act was passed, Chae Chan Ping and
roughly 600 of his compatriots soon landed seeking entry." 2 Another
20,000 Chinese laborers with re-entry permits were sojourning in China,
most with the intention of returning to their former U.S. residence. 3
Congress deliberately acted without the concurrence of the Chinese
government, leaving no question that the statute intentionally violated
the 1880 treaty.1 4 The Supreme Court's opinion in Chae Chan Ping (The
Chinese Exclusion Case) sided with Congress, conclusively pronouncing
the "later in time" rule sustaining the operative domestic effect of statutes
violating international norms.' Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Field justified this doctrine on the basis of deference to the authority of
Congress:
The question whether our government is justified in disregarding its
engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of
the courts .... This court is not a censor of the morals of other
departments of the government; it is not invested with any authority
to pass judgment upon the motives of their conduct. When once it
98. Id.
99. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at 90-93.
100. 25 Stat. 504 (1888).
101. Some scholars claim that, even while Secretary of State Bayard was engaged in active
negotiations, unaware of the change in strategy, President Cleveland sign illed his approval of the
bill to Sen. Scott, in the unrealized hope that this action would gain the Democratic Party popularity
on the West Coast in the presidential elections of 1888. Tsai, Overseas Chinese, supra note 24, at
92-93.
102. Tsai, Chinese Experience, supra not.- 31, at 73.
103. Shien-woo Kung, Chinese in American Life: Some Aspects of Their History, Status,
Problems, and Contributions 63-64 (1962).
104. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (the Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
105. This decision had been presaged by similar rulings in the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
599 (1884), and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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is established that congress possesses the power to pass an act, our
province ends with its construction, and its application to cases as
they are presented for determination. 6
The contemporaneous discourse concerning the international legality
of the Chinese exclusion acts is instructive in several respects. First,
although proponents of the exclusion acts sometimes offered cynical
rationales for abrogating the treaty with China, presidents sometimes
acquiesced in the breach for political gain, and the courts ultimately
sustained the breach out of deference, all three branches seriously
addressed the risk that international obligations would be violated. In the
aftermath of the Chinese Exclusion Case,'07 a more cavalier attitude
toward the interrelationship between international law and immigration
policy took hold. One can find few contemporary echoes of the ringing
pronouncements concerning national honor made by congressional
opponents of the exclusion acts,' by the key lower federal court
judges, 9 by the Supreme Court in Chew Heong,"0 and by Presidents
Hayes and Arthur."'
Second, the inclination to avoid responsibility for an international law
violation initially had the tendency to direct U.S. policy toward
international lawfulness, for example by canons of construction such as
the Charming Betsy presumption." 2 Once the political impetus toward
severe Chinese exclusion measures became unstoppable, the various
branches, facing an imminent or actual breach of international law, began
to play a game of political "dodgeball." They tried to displace
responsibility for the violation onto another actor, be it a treaty partner" 3
or a coordinate branch of the federal government." 4
106. 130 U.S. at 602-03.
107. See supra note 12.
108. See supra notes 1, 6-7, 45, 47-49.
109. See supra notes 40, 46, 78, 81, 85-89.
110. See supra notes 90-92.
111. See supra notes 8, 10, 65-67, 71.
112. See supra note 18.
113. For example, proponents of H.R. 2423 insisted that China had breached the Burlingame
Treaty by failing to eradicate the coolie trade. 8 Cong. Rec. 1299 (February 14, 1879) (remarks of
Sen. Blaine).
114. For example, proponents of Chinese exclusion measures in 1879 suggested that the
President, by not responding to Congressional demands to renegotiate the Burlingame Treaty, had
implicitly invited Congress to abrogate it. See, e.g., 8 Cong. Rec. 1271, 1274 (February 13, 1879)
(remarks of Sen. Morgan).
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Third, at one time there was substantial doubt concerning the
constitutional authority of Congress to legislate in violation of
international obligations.15 The raw power of Congress to adopt
immigration laws that breach treaties is generally recognized following
the Chinese Exclusion Case."6 A long-term, and possibly unanticipated,
consequence is the radical diminution of the seriousness with which
Congress, as well as the Executive and the courts, ponder the
international legality of proposed immigration policies.
Finally, the weakness of Chinaas a treaty partner was a significant
factor emboldening proponents of the Chinese exclusion acts.
Participants in the debates agreed that China was unlikely to take serious
retaliatory action for the denial of its subjects' treaty rights.11 7 While
international norms relevant to U.S. immigration policy in the twentieth
century are primarily derived from multilateral treaties or from
customary law, the problem of weak enforcement mechanisms persists.
The improbability of serious international repercussions for adopting
even flagrantly illegal policies continues to breed cynicism and disregard
for preserving the "national honor" in the course of devising immigration
policy.
III. HIV EXCLUSION
Since 1987, the United States has excluded imrnmigrar.ts and travelers..8
who are HIV1 19 positive. Although several waivers are now available for
international travelers, the policy itself violates the International Health
Regulations, a treaty binding on the United States. 2 ' Despite this
115. See supra notes 65-67 (1879 Hayes veto message).
116. See supra note 12.
117. Sen. Matthews of Ohio, an opponent of H.RL 2423, questioned whether similar proposals
would be made to breach a treaty with a "fighting nation" such as Great Britain, France, or Germany.
8 Cong. Rec. 1274 (February 13, 1879). Sen. Conkling suggested that, if Congress voted to breach
the treaty, it would be subject to the criticism, "in the phrase of boys, that we had not taken
somebody of our size." 8 Cong. Rec. 1309 (February 14, 1879). A sponsor of the legislation, Sen.
Sargent of California, stressed that both France and Great Britain had adopted tax measures that
arguably violated their treaties with China and had not suffered any retaliation. 8 Cong. Rec. 1313
(February 14, 1879).
118. "Travelers" refers to persons who enter the United States for purposes other than permanent
residence, such as for business, tourism, or education.
119. "HIV" refers to both human immuncdeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS).
120. World Health Organization (WHO), International Sanitary Regulations, 4th World Health
Assembly, Official Rec. No. 37, at 334 (1952), reprinted as amended in WHO, International Health
Regulations (1969) (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter International Health Regulations]. The United States
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transgression and strong opposition of the World Health Organization
(WHO) to any HIV/AIDS exclusion policy, both Congress and the
Executive have participated in the implementation of this policy since its
inception.
Unlike the debates over the Chinese exclusion acts,' the discussions
about HIV/AIDS exclusion by Congress and the Executive lack any
serious discourse concerning U.S. obligations under international law.
Although the bigotry of the nineteenth century is no longer part of the
public record," the modem dialogue focuses solely on domestic
concerns such as economics and health, ignoring international
considerations. The history of HIV/AIDS exclusion illustrates the
astonishing disappearance of international law from immigration policy
discourse since the Chinese Exclusion Case."2
A. The International Health Regulations
WHO, an organ of the United Nations, has the authority to adopt
regulations necessary to fight the international spread of disease. 4
Under the WHO Constitution, these regulations are binding on United
Nations member states unless a state submits a reservation within a
designated time period that is accepted by the World Health Assembly.'25
Based on this authority, in 1951 the International Health Regulations
(Regulations) were adopted by the World Health Assembly. 26 The
purpose of the Regulations is to "ensure the maximum security against
the international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with
world traffic."'127
has adopted the regulations without reservation. Id., Annex I at 52. For a discussion of the historical
development of international cooperation in public health, see 1 David M. Leive, International
Regulatory Regimes 15-42 (1976).
121. See supra part II.
122. But cf 139 Cong. Rec. S1721 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) ("I
had reached the conclusion that every possible concession had already been made to the AIDS lobby
and to the homosexual rights movement which feeds it. But the Clinton Administration's kowtowing
to this arrogant and repugnant political group is beyond belief.").
123. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
124. WHO Const. art 21.
125. The WHO Constitution provides that "Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come
into force for all members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly
except for such members as may notify the Director General of rejection or reservations within the
period stated in the notice." Id. art. 22.
126. International Health Regulations, supra note 120.
127. Id. at 5.
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The Regulations state that they are to be the maximum measures
applicable to international traffic a member state may adopt to protect its
territory against certain enumerated diseases. 28 Moreover, in 1957 the
World Health Assembly declared that the Regulations also apply to
diseases not specifically listed. 9 For unlisted diseases, the Regulations
require that any actions taken by member states be in accordance with
the principle of minimal interference with international traffic. 3 '
For health measures implemented by member states to control the
spread of unlisted diseases, the Regulations act as a ceiling. They permit
a state to require a health document only for the listed diseases.' 3 '
Therefore, any state requiring a document for diseases that are not listed
is acting in violation of the Regulations. 132 In 1985, WHO stated:
In accordance with Article 81 of the International Health
Regulations... no health document, other than those provided for
in the Regulations, shall be required in international traffic; thus it
is pointed out that there is no provision for any certificate
guaranteeing that a person entering any country or coming from
any country is free from a given disease. This also applies to AIDS,
and no country bound by the Regulations may refuse entry into its
territory to a person who fails to provide a medical certificate
stating that he or she is not carrying the AIDS virus.
33
The prohibition on health-related documents outside the scope of the
Regulations applies to any questionnaires a traveler must complete prior
to entry. 34 Thus, the United States policy of requiring travelers to
128. Id. art. 23. The Regulations initially covered plague, cholera, yellow fever and smallpox. Dr.
P. J. Delon, The International Health Regulations: A Practical Guide 9 (197:5).
129. WHO, Fourth Report of the Committee on International Quarantine, 10th World Health
Assembly, Official Rec. No. 79, Annex 1, at 495 (1957).
130. Id.
131. International Health Regulations, supra note 120, art. 81 ("No health document, other than
those provided for in these Regulations, shall be required in international traffic.').
132. See Nancy E. Allin, Note, The AIDS Pandemic: International Travel and Immigration
Restrictions and the World Health Organization's Response, 28 Va. J. Int'l ,. 1043, 1050 (1988).
133. 60 Epidemiological Rec. 311 (1985). WHO reiterated this statement in 1986 in response to
requests from Member States for advice about certificates guaranteeing that a person is free from
AIDS. 61 Epidemiological Rec. 27 (1986). See also WHOISPA/GLO/87.1 (1987) ("No measures,
and no health document, other than those provided for in the Regulations, may be imposed on
arriving travelers.").
134. See Delon, supra note 128, at 20 ("No other document can be required for travellers: for
example, it is not admissible to make a traveller fill in, for health reasons, a cuestionnaire .... ').
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complete a visa application stating whether they are HIV-positive 35 is
not permitted.
The Regulations recognize an important distinction between
international travelers and migrants. For migrants, i.e., persons intent on
residing in another country for a protracted period of time, the
Regulations allow additional health measures to be taken.136 Although the
Regulations do not address immigrants specifically, it is logical to
assume that a country could also impose additional health requirements
on those seeking permanent residence. States that choose to impose extra
conditions on migrants must notify WHO of such provisions.
137
Despite their apparent violation, the Regulations have not been
invoked to challenge the U.S. policy on HIV/AIDS. Although the
Regulations provide for a dispute resolution procedure with final
authority in the International Court of Justice,1 31 WHO historically has
relied on informal negotiation with state and public health officials and
the "good offices" of the Director-General.'39 No alleged violation of the
Regulations, however, has ever been brought before the International
Court of Justice.14 As a result, the legally binding Regulations are
treated more like recommendations. 4'
B. The WHO Global Progamme on AIDS
Although the Regulations are the only binding international law
prohibiting HIV-related restrictions on travel, WHO has also launched a
crusade of "soft-law"' 42 through its "Global Strategy for the Prevention
135. See infra part III.C.
136. International Health Regulations, supra note 120, art. 84 ("Migrants, nomads, seasonal
workers or persons taldng part in periodic mass congregations ... may be subjected to additional
health measures .... Each State shall notify the Organization of the provisions of any such laws and
regulations ... .'). See also Delon, supra note 128, at 20 n.3 ("The Mecca Pilgrimage constitutes one
of these congregations, though it is not mentioned by name in the Regulations.").
137. International Health Regulations, supra note 120, art. 84.
138. Leive, supra note 120, at 46.
139. Id.
140. See Delon, supra note 128, at 22.
141. Leive, supra note 120, at 46.
142. See Anthony S. DiNota, Note, The World Health Organization's Resolution Condemning
AIDS-Related Discrimination and Ongoing United States Noncompliance at the Border, 12 N.Y. L.
Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 151 (1991) (arguing that WHO declarations are merely moral in character
with no legal authority).
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and Control of AIDS."'1 43 As part of this campaign, WIO in 1988 issued
a resolution entitled "Avoidance of discrimination in relation to HIV-
infected people and people with AIDS,"'" and a "Statement on
Screening of International Tr-avellers for Infection with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus." 4 The Resolution urges member states to
avoid discriminatory action against HIV-infected people in national
policies, including those affecting travel, aimed at the prevention and
control of HIV infection and AIDS. 146 The Statement asserts that
screening international travelers for HIV is "ineffective, impractical and
wasteful."'47 The United States has consistently espoused the tenets of
the Global Programme, despite current U.S. travel restrictions.
148
C. United States Policy
Notwithstanding binding international law to the contrary, the United
States began its policy of excluding travelers with HRV in 1987. This
policy was amended several times before being codified in 1993. The
debates consistently failed to recognize the clear conflict with U.S.
international obligations.
1. The Helms Amendment
In 1987, Senator Jesse Helms attached an amendment to an
appropriations bill that required the President to add HIV infection to the
143. See WHO, Global Strategy for the Prevention and control of AIDS, U.N. Doe. A143/341
(1988). WHO is authorized "to make recommendations to members with respect to any matter within
the competence of the Organization." WHO Const. art. 23. Therefore, all statements and resolutions
issued by WHO, other than the International Health Regulations, are mere rccommendations with no
legally binding effect. However, it could be argued that at some point a recommendation by WHO
becomes customary international law.
144. Res. WHA 41.24, VHO/GPAIINF/88.2 (1988).
145. WHO/GPA/INF/88.3 (1988). For a more comprehensive discussion of these resolutions see
DiNota, supra note 142.
146. WHO/GPA/INF/88.2 (1988).
147. WHO/GPA/INF/88.3 (1988). The Statement also refers to a consultation of experts that
convened in March 1987. Id. At that meeting, the consultation noted that "[n]o measures, and no
health documents, other than those provided for in the [International Health] Regulations, may be
imposed on arriving travellers." WHO/SPA/GLO/87.1 (1987).
148. For example, on December 1, 1994, the United States signed the Paris AIDS Summit
Declaration which stated, among other things, that persons with HII/AIDS should not be
discriminated against and should enjoy equal protection of the law with regard to travel.
International observers noted that the United States' policy was "paradoxicar' because despite
funding AIDS research, the U.S. maintains irrational travel restrictions on foreiguers. Scott Kraft, 42
Nations Sign Symbolic AIDS Pact, L.A. Times, Dec. 2, 1994, at A6.
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list of dangerous contagious diseases for which persons seeking entry to
the United States could be excluded. 49 President Reagan signed the bill
into law on July 11, 1987.150 Under the Helms Amendment, persons
seeking permanent residence in the United States were required to be
tested for HIV/AIDS prior to arrival. Those who tested positive were
subject to exclusion without the opportunity of a waiver and were denied
permanent residence.' Persons seeking entry for limited visits, i.e.,
tourism or business, were required to complete a visa application stating
that they were free from infection with any excludable diseases and were
subject to testing at the discretion of consular officials and INS
officials. 5 Those who declared they had HIV/AIDS could seek a
thirty-day waiver that, if granted, would allow them to enter. However,
such a waiver resulted in a passport stamp indicating they had a
dangerous contagious disease as well as a record in the American
Embassy of their home country.'53
Congressional debate about the Helms Amendment was limited and
did not consider international law. Senator Helms, in support of the
amendment, stated that "[t]he Federal Government has the obligation to
protect its citizenry from foreigners... who carry deadly diseases which
threaten the health and safety of U.S. citizens."' 15 4 Citing WHO statistics
and the fact that other countries, including China, South Korea, Saudi
Arabia, Belgium and India, test immigrants for HIV infection, Senator
Helms could not "see any logical reason for opposing th[e]
amendment."' 55 One Senator, afraid that the Senate was "going to go off
149. The bill initially required the President take this step before funds authorized by the bill for
the emergency provision of drugs determined to prolong the life of persons with AIDS could be
released. 133 Cong. Rec. S7405 (daily ed. June 2, 1987).
150. For a more comprehensive discussion of the legislation see Juan P. Osuna, The Exclusion
from the United States of Aliens Infected with the AIDS Virus: Recent Developments and Prospects
for the Future, 16 Hous. J. Int'l L. 1, 7-12 (1993).
151. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,542 (1987).
152. 52 Fed. Reg. 21,607 (1987). Although the INS regulations applied to travelers as well, it
appears from the limited debate that the Helms Amendment was only intended to apply to those
seeking permanent residence. 133 Cong. Rec. S7405 (daily ed. June 2, 1987). See also Sandra G.
Boodman, U.S. Ban on Tourists With HIV Surprises Some Lawmakers; Jailing of Visitor Sparks
Calls for Change in Policy, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 1989, at A2 (quoting Sen. Alan Cranston as saying
"Congress intended this policy to apply... only to individuals seeking permanent residency .... At
no time during the debate was there any discussion indicating that this policy was intended to bar
entry of individuals visiting the United States.").
153. See Philip J. Hilts, U.S. to Ease Passport Curbs on Visitors Infected with AIDS Virus, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 1990, at B6.
154. 133 Cong. Rec. S7405 (daily ed. June 2, 1987).
155. Id.
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half-cocked," did acknowledge that such legislation should be subject to
public debate and was not well suited for an appropriations bill.'56
Nonetheless, the amendment was unanimously approved by the Senate
without any mention of possible international implications.
15 7
This exclusion policy received worldwide attention in 1989 when a
Dutch official, Hans Paul Verhoef, was detained as he attempted to enter
the United States to attend an international AIDS conference.' 58 Mr.
Verhoef had not declared on his visa application that he had AIDS and
was stopped by customs officials when the medication AZT was found in
his luggage.'59 Although an immigration judge granted him a waiver after
he had spent several days in a Minnesota prison, the incident starkly
highlighted the U.S. policy."'O Calls for a change immediately
followed.'
In May 1989, one month after the Verhoef affair, the Attorney
General issued a directive that eased visa restrictions and allowed entries
of people with HIV for up to thirty days to seek medical treatment, attend
conferences, and visit relatives. 2 However, tourists and general business
travelers with HIV were still denied admission. 163  The Bush
Administration later granted the State Department authority to issue
special ten-day visas for persons attending professional, scientific, or
academic conferences in the United States."6 During this period,
members of Congress frequently noted that the U.S. policy was contrary
156. Id. (statement of Sen. Danforth) ("This is not an issue that has enjoyed the analysis of
committees before coming to the Senate.... I am going to vote for the Helm.; Amendment regretting
that it is coming up on a supplemental appropriations bill, but I would also like to urge... [a) forum
in which we in the Senate could be educated as to the facts of AIDS and also directed to those major
philosophical, political issues, and budgetary issues that we are going to have to face up to.").
157. Id. The actual vote was 96 yeas to 0 nays with four senators absenL Id. The amendment
required a serologic test for HIV as part of the medical examination necessary for admission into the
United States. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,540-03 (1987) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 34.2(b),
34.4(a) (1),( I )(iii),(2),(3),(5)).
158. Victor F. Zonana, Dutch AIDS Patient Freed, Travels to S.F., L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, at
A3.
159. Id.
160. Boodman, supra note 152.
161. Id.
162. See Foreigners with AIDS Allowed Limited Entry to US., 66 Interpieter Releases 624, 625-
26 (1989); Sandra G. Boodman, Foreigners With AIDS to Be Permitted Limited Entry to US., Wash.
Post, May 19, 1989, at A20.
163. 66 Interpreter Releases at 625.
164. See U.S. Creates Special AIDS Visas, 67 Interpreter Releases 467 (1990).
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to WHO standards 16' and undermined international efforts to fight the
spread of HIV/AIDS. 1
66
Controversy about the HIV exclusion policy created confusion and
buck-passing among lawmakers during 1990. Members of Congress
claimed that the Executive could remove HIV from the list
administratively through the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS). 67 The Bush Administration, on the other hand, maintained that,
because Congress had passed legislation adding HIV to the list, only
Congress could take HIV off the list.161
2. IMMA CT
The passage of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) 169 mooted
the buck-passing controversy. IMMACT provided that the HHS
Secretary was to maintain a list of "communicable disease[s] of public
health significance" for the health-related exclusion grounds. 70 In
January 1991, HHS published proposed regulations that removed HIV
and all other diseases except active tuberculosis from the list for which
persons could be excluded."' During the public comment period that
followed, members of the public, Congress, and the Executive all voiced
strong opposition. 72 One proposal, made by a group of fifteen
Republican members of the House, asked that the HHS Secretary, then
Dr. Louis Sullivan, make a distinction between visitors and immigrants.
They encouraged Dr. Sullivan to continue the exclusion of people with
165. See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, U.S. to Ease Passport Curbs on Visitors Infected with AIDS Virus,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1990, at B6 (quoting Rep. Henry A. Waxman); 136 Cong. Rec. S4069-70
(daily ed. April 5, 1990) (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston).
166. See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Urged to End Screening on AIDS, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989,
at B14 (quoting Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); Boodman, supra note 152. In 1989, the National
Commission on AIDS also criticized the exclusion policy, stating that it was contrary to international
opinion and practice. Osuna, supra note 150, at 14.
167. See Malcolm Gladwell, HHS Can Lift AIDS-Virus Immigration Barrier, Opinion Says,
Wash. Post, May 23, 1990, at A9.
168. Id. See also Osuna, supra note 150, at 16-17.
169. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
170. 8U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
171. 56 Fed. Reg. 2484,2485 (1991).
172. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Reversal of AIDS Exclusion is Said to be Shelved; 4-Year Ban
to Immigration Criticized as Discriminatory and Medically Unjust(ied, Wash. Post, May 25, 1991,
at A6 (citing the receipt of 40,000 letters by HHS in opposition to removing HIV from the exclusion
list); Robert Pear, Health Dept. Loses in AIDS Rule Dispute, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1991, at A18
(discussing division in Bush Administration between the HHS and the Department of Justice).
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HIV who sought permanent residence but not those seeking entry for
limited duration. 73 Although the Representatives did uot acknowledge
the International Health Regulations in their proposal, such a policy
would have been consistent with the Regulations. Instead, in the face of
vast criticism, Dr. Sullivan backed down completely, issuing regulations
that kept HIV on the list. 74 These regulations remained in effect
throughout the remainder of the Bush Administration despite continued
criticism."
As with the Helms Amendment, Congressional debates about
IMMACT did not mention international law, the International Health
Regulations, or the WHO Global Programme on AIDS as they pertain to
HIV travel restrictions. Ironically, on October 1, 1990, just twenty-six
days before the passage of IMMACT, a resolution was introduced in
Congress designating December 1, 1990 as "World AIDS Day. ' 17 6 This
resolution declared that "the one hundred and sixty-seven Member States
of the World Health Organization ... have accepted the responsibility to
... control the spread of HIV infection... in conformity with the WHO
Global AIDS Strategy."'177 Despite Congress's awareness of WHO's
Global Strategy, no hearings on IMMACT discussed the possible
international consequences of health-related exclusion. WHO's
"Statement on Screening of International Travellers for Infection with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus"'78 references the "Report of the
Consultation on International Travel and HIV Infection."'179 Even a
cursory reading of this Report reveals that HIV exclusion of international
travelers is contrary to the Regulations. Yet, Congress operated as if
completely oblivious to the Regulations.
3. The Clinton Administration
When President Clinton took office, it appeared HIV would finally be
removed from the exclusion list of contagious diseases. As part of his
173. Alexander Peters, 15 Republicans Target AIDS Immigration Plan, The Recorder, Feb. 12,
1991, at 1.
174. 56 Fed. Reg. 25,000 (1991) (codified at42 C.F.R. pt. 34).
175. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H6253 (daily ed. July 21, 1992) (statement by Rep. McDermott
that the "policy toward HIV infected people... has embarrassed and isolated the United States in
the international community"). See also Osuna, supra note 150, at 20-22.
176. 136 Cong. Rec. E 3065 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
177. 136 Cong. Rec. E3065, E3066 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
178. WHO/GPA/INF/88.3 (1988).
179. WHO/SPA/GLO/87.1 (1987).
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"10-point plan" for immigration reform, issued during the presidential
campaign, he had vowed to end AIDS immigration restrictions. 8 ' When
HHS Secretary Donna Shalala was poised to drop HIV from the list in
February 1993,18' Congress reacted by codifying the existing policy. 82
The debate on this legislation, although extensive, focused primarily on
public health and economics.'83
With the state of the Nation's health care system at the forefront of
public concern, the focus was turned toward the cost of allowing people
with HIV into the country."s Unlike the 1987 debate, where the threat to
public health and the economic impact were two separate questions, the
1993 debates blurred the issues by asking whether the "public charge"
exclusion ground 8 1 would be sufficient to keep those with HIV out of
the country.'86 Although some members of Congress focused on the
difference between travelers and immigrants,"8 the final legislation made
no such distinction. International law was not discussed. It was noted,
however, that the United States has "been boycotted for [its] travel policy
by the International Red Cross [and] by the World Health Organization.
"188
With enough Congressional support to override a veto, the legislation
was enacted without any protest from President Clinton.8 9 Whether
Congress or the Executive was aware of the International Health
Regulations and their application to HIV exclusion remains unclear.
180. See Bush, Clinton Differ on Immigration, 69 Interpreter Releases 1030 (1992).
181. Joyce Price, Dropping AIDS Ban Irks Doctors, Wash. Times, Feb. 10, 1993, at Al (noting
also that the American Medical Association was against the proposed policy as it would apply to
permanent residents).
182. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 § 2007, Pub. L. 103-43, 107 Stat.
122 (1993) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) to include aliens with HIV). For an in depth
analysis of this legislation and the accompanying debates see Osuna, supra note 150, at 25-39. See
also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. 118 (1993) (stating that the HIV/AIDS
exclusion policy is intended to be "a codification of current administrative practice").
183. Osuna, supra note 150, at 25-39.
184. Amy L. Fairchild & Eileen A. Tynan, Policies of Containment: Immigration in the Era of
AIDS, 84 Am. J. Pub. Health 2011, 2017 (1994) (citations omitted).
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1994) (allowing for the exclusion of persons who may, at any time,
become a public charge). Although "public charge" is not defined, the greatest number of visa
denials are based on this provision. See James A-R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular
Officers, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1991).
186. Fairchild & Tynan, supra note 184, at 2018.
187. Id.
188. 139 Cong. Rec. H1204 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (statement ofRep. Waxman).
189. Frank J. Murray, Clinton Loses Fight to Remove HIV Ban; House Backs Senate on
Immigration, Wash. Times, March 12, 1993, at Al.
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Neither branch ever acknowledged that international law had any bearing
on the matter. President Clinton, when asked about the HIV exclusion
provision at the signing ceremony for the bill, merely remarked, "That's
the will of Congress."'
IV. INTERDICTION AND FORCED RETURN OF ASYLUM-
SEEKERS
With the May 2, 1995, announcement that irregular Cuban migrants
intercepted on the high seas would be repatriated directly to Cuba,191 the
issue of the international legality of interdiction and fbrced repatriation
of asylum-seekers gained newfound urgency. 92 In the press briefing
announcing the new Cuban policy, no mention was made of the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States
ratified in 1968,'9' nor to its prohibition on refbulement (forced
repatriation) of refugees.'94 While Attorney General Reno stated that
interdicted Cuban asylum-seekers with good reason not to seek entry by
means of in-country processing at the U.S. interest section in Havana
would be screened prior to repatriation, 95 the laconic text of the accord
190. President Clinton Remarks During a White House Signing Ceremony for the National
Institutes of Health Reauthorization Bill, Reuters, June 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Script File.
191. Transcript of Press Briefing by Attorney General Reno, Gen. Sheehan, Under Secretary
Tamoff, May 2, 1995, U.S. Newswire, May 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws
File.
192. With the closure of the safe haven for Haitians at Guantanamo in January 1995, for all but
certain unaccompanied minors, a similar policy of repatriation of Haitian asylum-seekers also
prevails. U.S. Policy Changed with Guantanamo Safe Havens; Providing Haitian Refugees
Temporary Shelter Offered Protection without Promise of Permanent Resettlement, Wash. Post, Feb.
5, 1995, at A24.
193. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, done January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force October 4, 1967).
194. Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
incorporated by reference into the 1967 Protocol, supra note 193, establi.;hes the principle of non-
refoulement, prohibiting states from returning refugees "in any manner whatsoever" to the frontiers
of territories where they face threats to life or freedom. In the May 2, 1995, press briefing, Attorney
General Reno indicated that "[m]easures will be taken to ensure that pen ons who claim a genuine
need for protection which they believe cannot be satisfied by applying at the U.S. interest section
will be examined before return." Transcript of Press Briefing, supra note 191. Most Cubans
intercepted at sea and indicating an intent to apply for asylum will be directed to make use of the
possibility for in-country refugee processing in Havana. Id.
195. Id.
'Vol. 70:589, 1995
International Law and U.S. Immigration Policy
with Cuba vaguely reaffirms only unspecified international obligations of
both nations.
1 6
The Administration's lack of careful attention to international norms
in crafting this new agreement may be explained by its victory in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council,'97 establishing the surprising proposition that
asylum-seekers intercepted on the high seas may be returned directly to
their persecutors without violating the prohibition on refoulement. 95 It
may also reflect a recent tendency for developed states to craft bilateral
accords in order to evade their obligations under multilateral refugee
treaties. Unfortunately, this tactic has become all too common in
contemporary European immigration policy as well.' 99
We will not attempt to provide an exhaustive critique of Haitian
Centers Council." Rather, this section explores why policymakers
chose, in Justice Field's words, to "announc[e] the law to be what the
community at the time wishes it should be." '' In the case of interdiction,
all branches played a role. The Executive took the initiative to please the
public, regardless of international obligation. The Supreme Court
conferred its somewhat equivocal blessing on the policy.2 2 And
Congress remained passive, despite its previous explicit commitment to a
policy of bringing our immigration law into conformity with the Refugee
Protocol. 2°
3
196. U.S.-Cuba Joint Statement on Migration, May 2, 1995, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch 397 (1995)
("All actions taken will be consistent with the parties' international obligations").
197. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
198. Id. at 2562-63.
199. See Joan Fitzpatrick Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary "Refuge" and Local
Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 Va. . Int'l L. 13, 33, 38-39 (1994) (discussing removal
agreements between European Union and Central European buffer states).
200. For such critiques see, e.g., Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations,
104 Yale L.J 39 (1994); Thomas David Jones, The Haitian Refugee Crisis: A Quest for Human
Rights, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 77, 102 (1993) (characterizing Haitian Centers Council as "Dred Scott
case of immigration"); Nicholas R. Koberstein, Comment, Without Justification: Reliance on the
Presumption against Extraterritoriality in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J.
569 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy, 103
Yale L.J. 2391 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers
Council, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1 (1994).
201. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (the relevant community in this instance being
primarily voters and politicians in Florida).
202. See 113 S. Ct. at 2567.
203. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)
(1988)); S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141,
144, 149.
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At the early stages of the Haitian interdiction program, the United
States paid careful heed to the terms of the Refugee Protocol. A formal
opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice
indicated that the prohibition on refoulement applied on the high seas.2t 4
The 1981 United States-Haiti accord stated that return of interdicted
Haitians would be "selective."" The Executive Order implementing the
interdiction policy" provided for screening of asylum seekers aboard
Coast Guard vessels, to insure "strict observance of our international
obligations concerning those who genuinely flee persecution in their
homeland. '207 Thus, in the initial phases of interdiction, the Government
recognized the relevance of international law and shaped its policy with
the prohibition of refoulement clearly in mind.
During the decade that Executive Order No. 12,2324 governed the
Haitian interdiction program, however, very few Haitians managed to
pass beyond shipboard screening to receive full asylumn hearings in the
United States.2 8 Thus, when the infamous Kennebunkport Order" was
issued in May 1992, mandating repatriation without screening, the
practical impact on Haitian asylum-seekers was arguably marginal.
Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of the Kennebunkport Order was
substantial. Many feared the potential damage to respect for international
refugee law that the Order might engender, and litigation resulted.210
Harold Koh, drawing on his earlier studies of the contemporary
dynamics of separation of powers,2 1 has convincingly explained the
pattern of executive action,2 12 judicial imprimatur,2 3 and legislative
204. 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242,248 (1981).
205. Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559.
206. Exec. OrderNo. 12,324,46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
207. Id. at 48,109.
208. Over 25,000 Haitians were repatriated from the inception of the interdiction program in 1981
until the coup against President Aristide in September 1991. Andrew G. Nizor, Comment, Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council: The Return of Haitian Refugees, 17 Fordham Int'l L.L 1062, 1086 (1994).
209. President George Bush issued Executive Order No. 12,807 from his vacation home in
Kennebunkport, Maine, on May 23, 1992, ordering that persons seeking to enter the United States
illegally could be intercepted at sea and returned to the country of origin, without screening for
refugee status. It declared that the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees does
not apply "beyond the territorial sea of the United States." 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133-34 (1992).
210. See Victoria Clawson, Elizabeth Detweiler & Laura Ho, Litigating as Law Students: An
Inside Look at Haitian Centers Council, 103 Yale L.J. 2337 (1994).
211. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the
Iran-Contra Affair (1990).
212. Koh notes that Presidents Bush and Clinton were more reactive than active, pursuing
interdiction not as part of a forward-looking plan, but in response to precipitous events and out of
fear of potential political damage from apparing impotent to stem an uncontrolled tide of arrivals.
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acquiescence 214 that characterized the "Haiti Paradigm." The Haitian
situation of 1992 and 1993 was in some senses unique rather than the
embodiment of a paradigm. Unusual factors included the frustrated
expectation that President Clinton would keep his campaign promise to
reverse the Bush policy215 and the equally frustrated hope that the flow of
refugees would cease if President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to
power in late 1993 pursuant to the Governor's Island Accords.21 6 When
the Haitian military refused to comply with those Accords,217 the policy
dilemma became even more acute.
Eventually, the Clinton Administration moderated the Haitian
interdiction policy, replacing it in 1994 with a policy of offshore
screening218 and then safe haven.21 9 These policies continued to impede
Haitian access to the political asylum system in the United States, but
they were more consistent with U.S. obligations under the Refugee
Protocol than interdiction without screening had been."o
Although U.S. policy toward Haitian asylum-seekers took various
turns away from and then back towards international legality, the
disregard for international norms that characterized certain phases
appears deeply entrenched in the attitudes of contemporary
policymakers. At the time of Koh's 1994 article, the Clinton
Administration had already extended the interdiction policy to ships
containing Chinese migrants."' The May 1995 migration accord with
Cuba suggests that Haitian Centers Council has diminished, almost to
the vanishing point, the shaping influence of international law on U.S.
immigration policy. This disregard of international norms persists even
in contexts most clearly implicating foreign relations.
One of the striking aspects of Haitian Centers Council is the Supreme
Court's reliance on a highly contrived reading of the Refugee Protocol in
The specter of the Marielito boatlift haunted both. Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in
United States Human Rights Policy, 103 Yale L.J. 2391, 2409-11 (1994).
213. Id. at 2413-23.
214. Id. at 2411-13.
215. Id. at 2401.
216. Id. at 2397-98 (describing negotiation of Accords in meetings held on Governor's Island in
New York).
217. Id.
218. See Pizor, supra note 208, at 1086-88.
219. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 19-20.
220. Id. at 48-49.
221. Koh, supra note 212, at 2434.
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order to sustain the validity of the Executive's policy.' Possibly this
strategy represents the Court's effort to put the best face on a bad policy,
by creating a pretence that it is not, contrary to all appearances, in breach
of international law. On the other hand, specious interpretation of
international agreements has become rather a bad habit for the present-
day Court, illustrated most notably by the Court's decislion a year earlier
in United States v. Alvarez-Machain.'
The trend toward ratifying Executive policy by giving narrow
readings to U.S. treaty obligations is disturbing for two reasons. First, it
suggests an attitude of contempt for international law. While the "later in
time" rule 4 also limits the domestic legal effect of treaties, it does
nothing to impair the survival of those obligations on the international
plane, leaving open the possibility that victims of treaty breach may find
recourse through traditional means such as diplomatic protection.'
Second, by reading key provisions out of treaties that protect important
human rights, this judicial technique may do immense harm, by inviting
other state parties to treat their obligations in an equally cavalier fashion.
V. A PERVERSE CANON PRESUMING ABROGATION OF
UNCODIFIED CUSTOMARY NORMS
Less noted than Haitian Centers Council is the emergence of a
perverse canon, presuming that Congress has abrogated customary
international norms that have not been specifically implemented by
statute. This canon has played a dispositive role in at least two
immigration-related contexts: (1) the efforts to establish that civilians
fleeing armed conflict are entitled to protection under an expanded, non-
222. The Court held that Article 3 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(incorporated by reference in the Refugee Protocol) prohibits only the expulsion and not the return
of refugees, despite the Article's plain text ("No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened .... ."). Convention Relating to ths Status of Refugees, supra not, 194.
223. 504 U.S. 655 (1992). The Supreme Court held that the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty did
not prohibit kidnapping as a substitute for extradition. Id. Koh notes that the trend toward
questionably narrow readings of treaties arguably dates further back. Koh, supra note 212, at 2416
(citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1981), and Soci6t6 Nationale
Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (19E.7)). George Washington
University Law Professor Ralph Steinhardt jokingly refers to this trend of straitened interpretation as
"Honey, I Schlunk the treaty" (comment in private conversation with author).
224. See supra notes 12, 26, 104, 105 and accompanying text.
225. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, Justice Field observed that "[i]f thcre be any just ground of
complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the political department cf our government, which
is alone competent to act upon the subject." 130 U.S. 581,609 (1889).
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conventional norm of non-refoulement; 26 and (2) cases challenging the
indefinite imprisonment of excludable aliens who cannot be returned to
any other country, 7 under the customary prohibition on arbitrary
detention.2 8
The status of customary international law in U.S. domestic law
remains beset by troublesome uncertainties." The ambiguities arise from
the opaque dictum of Justice Gray in The Paquete Habana.20 The basic
holding of that case was hardly innovative-that the "law of nations" is
operative law enforceable by domestic U.S. courts, on behalf of affected
individuals, even in the absence of its formal implementation by
statute." Gray, like his eighteenth century predecessors on the Court,
displayed an admirable familiarity with the authoritative sources of the
"law of nations" and comfort with its status as "law.'232
Perhaps coincident with the emergence of the United States as a
significant world power, Gray tempers his holding on the enforceability
of customary international law with the caveat that it may be negated by
a "controlling" act of any of the three branches of the federal
government.2  With respect to Congress, Gray may have been extending
the doctrine of the Chinese Exclusion Case (then of fairly recent
memory) from treaties to customary law. 4 But his careless recognition
of a power of abrogation in the Executive" and in the Judiciary has
created serious conceptual difficulties, especially vexing in the
immigration context.
226. See American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
227. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986); Gisbert v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir.),
amended, 997 F. 2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993).
228. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §702 (1987)
(listing "prolonged arbitrary detention" among the norms included in the customary international law
of human rights recognized in the United States).
229. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Is the President Above Customary International Law?, 86 Am. J.
Int'l L. 757 (1992); Michael J. Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 321 (1985); Jordan J.
Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 377 (1987).
230. 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see supra note 23.
231. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
232. 175 U.S. at 708-12.
233. See supra note 23.
234. See supra note 12.
235. In a recent article, Jordan Paust notes that the Brief for the United States in The Paquete
Habana did not assert a right in the President to violate customary international law. Instead, it
argued, unsuccessfully, that the seizures were consistent with custom. Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and
the President: Rediscovering the Brieffor the United States, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 981,984 (1994).
Washington Law Review
The problems posed by the Paquete Habana dictum are illustrated by
American Baptist Churches v. Meese. 6 Plaintiffs alleged that the
practice of deporting civilians to situations of internal armed conflict in
El Salvador and Guatemala violated customary international law. 7
Assuming the existence of pertinent customary law," Judge Peckham
concluded that "Congress has specifically rejected the asserted norm of
temporary refuge." 9 His support for this proposition was that "Congress
did not include within the 1980 [Refugee] Act any reference to a right of
temporary refuge for aliens fleeing general conditions of violence or
internal armed conflict." '24
Responding to plaintiffs' argument that this approach ignores the
presumption that acts of Congress should be construed to be consistent
with international law, Judge Peckham found that "the only 'possible
construction' of the Refugee Act of 1980 is that it was intended to
provide the exclusive means for obtaining refugee status in this
country."24' He also noted that various bills to provide suspension of
deportation to Salvadorans had failed.242
Judge Peckham did not mention any evidence that Congress had
explicitly discussed the existence of a customary norm of temporary
refuge nor deliberately chosen to abrogate it. The failure of Congress to
codify the norm, standing alone, was taken as a "controlling" legislative
act placing the United States in breach of its assumed customary law
obligation. As Ralph Steinhardt has observed, Judge Peckham
"transform[ed] the stated intention of Congress to conform domestic law
with international refugee standards into a silence with respect to
customary norms arising out of other doctrinal sources,"243 a silence that
was then misinterpreted as an intention to abrogate all uncodified
customary norms.
Judge Peckham's approach is the precise reverse of that taken by the
Supreme Court in Chew Heong2 and in Charming Betsy,245 requiring
236. 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989). For a powerful critique of the District Court's lack of
understanding of customary law and interpretive principles, see Steinhardt, ,upra note 18, at 1168-
1171.
237. 712 F. Supp. at 770.
238. Id. at 771.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Steinhardt, supra note 18, at 1170.
244. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
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courts to construe domestic law to be consistent with international norms
if at all possible. American Baptist Churches v. Meese reflects the
emergence of a perverse canon presuming internationally law-breaking
intention whenever Congress fails to advert to customary international
norms when legislating in the immigration field.
This new canon has also figured in cases concerning the indefinite
detention of Cubans who arrived as part of the Mariel boatlift but were
found to be excludable.246  These cases have sometimes been
misleadingly characterized as posing the question, "May the President
violate customary international law?"247 The real issue concerns the
appropriate response by the courts when their jurisdiction is invoked by
persons whose rights under customary international law are apparently
violated by executive action. Two separate questions are presented: (1)
as a threshold interpretive matter, should it be presumed, in the absence
of an explicit presidential repudiation of the customary norm, that
lower-level executive officials are bound to act in conformity to it; and
(2) must the courts acquiesce in a clear executive breach of customary
law, as they acquiesce in legislative acts that conflict with pre-existing
treaty obligations?
The courts considering the Marielito cases have failed to engage these
issues sufficiently, and in recent years have tended to dismiss summarily
arguments based on customary law. Because a great deal has already
been written about the Garcia-Mir litigation,248 we illustrate our
discussion with a recent Ninth Circuit case, in which a panel decision
granting a writ of habeas corpus to a Mariel Cuban was reversed en
banc.249
Judge Noonan, writing for the panel majority in Barrera-Echavarria,
emphasizes the central importance of proportionality in assessing
whether detention is permissible.25 He premises his grant of relief for the
petitioner primarily upon a narrow reading of the relevant, inexplicit
245. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). The case concerned
construction of the Nonintercourse Act of February 27, 1800, 2 Stat. 7, in light of customary
international standards on diplomatic protection.
246. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
247. See, e.g., Essays, Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 Am.
J. Int'l L. 913 (1986), 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 371 (1987).
248. See supra notes 229, 247.
249. Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir.
1995) (en banc).
250. 21F.3dat316.
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statutes.2"' In finding that those statutes do not delegate authority to the
Attorney General to confine a non-aggravated felon indefinitely in
maximum security, 2 Judge Noonan writes evocatively of the "rights of
the human person" 3and notes that "[t]imes have changed, and so has
what a person-any person-has a right to expect from our
government." 4 Yet, nowhere does he mention the customary norm
against prolonged arbitrary detention that was thoroughly briefed by the
American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae." Michel Foucault's
historical analysis of the 18th century French practice of lettres de cachet
merits repeated reference in Judge Noonan's opinion,256 but not the "law
of nations" on the subject at hand.
The panel decision was reversed en banc,s 7 but customary law, while
not ignored, was treated carelessly. Assuming the existence of a
customary prohibition on prolonged arbitrary detentio:a, 258 the en banc
majority concluded that the petitioner could not "avail himself of its
protections" because "international law is displaced in this area.., by a
combination of 'controlling acts' of the legislative, execative and judicial
branches." '259 The fact of carelessly breaching the norm, without its
conscious and deliberate abrogation, is now apparently sufficient to
dissipate the nation's commitment to the most basic praciples of human
rights.
In reviewing U.S. compliance with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,2 60 the Human Rights Committee noted that
U.S. policy on indefinite detention of excludable aliens may violate
fundamental human rights. 26' Thus, U.S. policy on Marielitos is
251. Id. at 317.
252. Barerra-Echavarria had been confined in various maximum security federal prisons for nine
years following his completion of a criminal sentence. 21 F.3d at 315-16.
253. Id. at 319.
254. Id.
255. 44 F.3d at 1441.
256. 21 F.3d at 318-19.
257. 44 F.3d 1441.
258. Id. at 1450.
259. Id. at 1450-51 (citing, inter alia, Gisbert and Garcia-Mir).
260. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N.
Doe. CCPRCI79IAdd. 50 at M 18, 33 (1995).
261. The Committee's conclusion is somewhat tentative, however:.
The Committee is concerned that excludable aliens are dealt with by lower standards of due
process than other aliens and, in particular, that those who cannot be depoited or extradited may
be held in detention indefinitely.
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questionable not only under the well-settled customary prohibition on
arbitrary detention, but also under the Covenant.2 62 Unfortunately, this
fact is unlikely to shift the courts from their indifference toward holding
executive branch officials accountable to international standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
The connection between international obligation and national honor
dominated early discussion of the Chinese exclusion laws within all three
branches of the federal government.263 After the Supreme Court decided
that Congress could breach a treaty in order to meet popular demand for
harsh immigration laws,2' however, the level of concern for international
law in shaping U.S. immigration policy diminished dramatically. Recent
history exposes a Congress ignorant of a treaty prohibiting exclusion of
travelers with HIV/AIDS,2 6' presidents ignoring the Refugee Protocol in
266subjecting asylum-seekers to interdiction, and courts ratifying unlawful
executive acts with little serious attention to international norms. 26
7
It is profoundly disturbing that contemporary U.S. immigration policy,
in a number of respects, falls short of international standards. Even more
troubling is the absence of international law as a relevant factor in
immigration policy discourse. That the political branches of the federal
government may consciously choose, without domestic legal
consequence, to abrogate the nation's international obligations is perhaps
an inescapable reality after the Chinese Exclusion Case.268 That
contemporary policymakers should be permitted by the courts to do so
unconsciously or cavalierly is not unavoidable.
The Committee recommends that appropriate measures be adopted as soon as possible to
ensure to excludable aliens the same guarantees of due process as are available to other aliens
and guidelines be established which would place limits on the length of detention of persons
who cannot be deported.
Id.
262. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16, 1966, entered
into force March 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe.
A16316 (1966).
263. See supra parts I-I.
264. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 191, 194, 209, 212 and accompanying text.
267. See supra part IV.
268. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Retired Justice Blackmun has written eloquently of the Supreme
Court's recent failures to show a "decent respect to the opinions of
mankind" in denying operative force to international norms.269 The
slipshod nature of recent immigration policymaking can be corrected by
a return to the values that animated the Supreme Court's interpretive
approach in Chew Heong.270 International law should onoe again be taken
as seriously as a lion in the path, avoided or overcome only after careful
consideration and with awareness of the dangers and costs inherent in
such action.
269. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 Yale L.. 39,40 (1994)
(quoting the Declaration of Independence).
270. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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